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Abstract
In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-
check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-
check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the
quasi-cyclic (QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic decoding of any
sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work against QC codes, but can be generalized
to broader classes of codes. We provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows
recovering a larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and we
use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We devise a theoretical
model for the decoder that describes and justifies our results. Numerical simulations are provided
that confirm the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms
Code-based Cryptosystems, LDPC codes, MDPC codes, Reaction Attacks, Timing Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
The code-based cryptosystems introduced by McEliece [18] and Niederreiter [20] are
among the oldest and most studied post-quantum public-key cryptosystems. They are com-
monly built upon a family of error correcting codes, for which an efficient decoding algorithm
2is known. The security of these systems is based on the hardness of the so called Syndrome
Decoding Problem (SDP), i.e., the problem of decoding a random linear code, which has
been proven to be NP-hard [7]. The best SDP solvers are known as Information Set Decoding
(ISD) algorithms and were introduced in 1962 by Prange [23]; improved through the years
(see [6], [17], [26], for some well known variants), these algorithms are characterized by
exponential complexity, even when considering adversaries equipped with quantum comput-
ers [8]. Because of their well studied and assessed security, code-based cryptosystems are
nowadays considered among the most promising candidates for the post-quantum world [9].
In the above schemes, and others of the same type, the private key is the representation of
a code, whose parameters are chosen in such a way to guarantee decoding of a given amount
of errors, which are intentionally introduced in the plaintext during encryption. The public
key is obtained through linear transformations of the secret key, with the aim of masking
the structure of the secret code. In the original McEliece proposal, Goppa codes were used:
on the one hand, this choice leads to a well assessed security (the original proposal is still
substantially unbroken); on the other hand, the corresponding public keys do not allow for
any compact representation, and thus have very large sizes.
A well-known way to address the latter issue is that of adding some geometrical structure
to the code, in order to guarantee that the public key admits a compact representation. The use
of quasi-cyclic (QC) codes with a sparse parity-check matrix naturally fits this framework: the
sparsity of the parity-check matrix allows for efficient decoding techniques, while the quasi-
cyclic structure guarantees compactness in the public key. In such a context, the additional
geometrical structure can be added without exposing the secret code: Quasi-Cyclic Low-
Density Parity-Check (QC-LDPC) and Quasi-Cyclic Moderate-Density Parity-Check (QC-
MDPC) code-based cryptosystems have been extensively studied in recent years [1], [2], [4],
[5], [19] and currently achieve relatively very small public keys. However, differently from
the bounded-distance decoders used for algebraic codes (like the mentioned Goppa codes), the
iterative decoders used for sparse parity-check codes are not characterized by a deterministic
decoding radius and, thus, decoding might fail with some probability, or Decoding Failure
Rate (DFR).
Such a feature is crucial, since it has been shown how this probabilistic nature of the
decoder actually exposes the system to cryptanalysis techniques based on the observation
of the decryption phase. State-of-the-art attacks of this kind are commonly called reaction
attacks, when based on decoding failures events [12], [13], [15], [22], or side-channel attacks,
when based on information such as the duration of the decoding phase (in this case we speak
3properly of timing attacks) or other quantities [10], [11], [21]. All these previous techniques
exploit the QC structure of the code and aim at recovering some characteristics of the secret
key by performing a statistical analysis on a sufficiently large amount of collected data.
The rationale is that many quantities that are typical of the decryption procedure depend
on a statistical relation between some properties of the secret key and the error vector that
is used during encryption. Thus, after observing a sufficiently large number of decryption
instances, an adversary can exploit the gathered information to reconstruct the secret key, or
an equivalent version of it. The reconstruction phase is commonly very efficient, unless some
specific choices in the system design are made [24], [25] which, however, may have some
significant drawbacks in terms of public key size. All the aforementioned attack techniques are
instead prevented if the DFR has negligible values [27] and the algorithm is implemented
with constant time. Nevertheless, at their current state, these solutions are far from being
practical and efficient, and the use of ephemeral keys (which means that each key-pair is
refreshed after just one decryption) is necessary to make these systems secure [1], [5].
In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks, and we show that information leakage
in the decoding phase can actually be related to the number of overlapping ones between
columns of the secret parity-check matrix. Furthermore, we show that all attacks of this kind
can be analyzed as a unique procedure, which can be applied to recover information about the
secret key, regardless of the code structure. Such an algorithm, when applied on a QC code,
permits to recover an amount of information greater than that retrievable through previously
published attacks. Moreover, we provide an approximate model that allows predicting the
behaviour of the decoder in the first iteration with good accuracy. This model justifies the
phenomenon that is at the basis of all the aforementioned attacks and can be even used
to conjecture new attacks. Our results are confirmed by numerical simulations and enforce
the employment of constant time decoders, with constant power consumption and negligible
DFR, in order to allow for the use of long-lasting keys in these systems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the notation used throughout the
manuscript and provides some basic notions about cryptosystems based on sparse parity-
check codes. In Section III we summarize state-of-the-art reaction and timing attacks, and
present a general algorithm that can be used to attack any sparse parity-check code. An
approximate model for the analysis of the first iteration of the BF decoder is presented in
Section IV. In Section V we describe some additional sources of information leakage, that
can be used by an opponent to mount a complete cryptanalysis of the system. Finally, in
Section VI we draw some conclusive remarks.
4II. PRELIMINARIES
We represent matrices and vectors through bold capital and small letters, respectively.
Given a matrix A, we denote as ai its i-th column and as ai,j its element in position (i, j).
Given a vector b, its i-th entry is referred to as bi; its support is denoted as φ(b) and is
defined as the set containing the positions of its non-null entries. The vector 0n corresponds
to the all-zero n-tuple; the function returning the Hamming weight of its input is denoted as
wt{·}.
A. LDPC and MDPC code-based cryptosystems
The schemes we consider are built upon a code C described by a sparse parity-check
matrix H ∈ Fr×n2 , where n is the code blocklength. We here focus on the case of regular
matrices, in which all the rows and all the columns have constant weights respectively equal to
w ≪ n and v ≪ r. The code C is then (v, w)-regular, and is commonly called Low-Density
Parity-Check (LDPC) code if w = O(logn), or Moderate-Density Parity-Check (MDPC)
code, if w = O(
√
n). Regardless of such a distinction, these two families of codes actually
have similar properties: they can be decoded with the same decoding algorithms and are thus
exposed in the same way to the attacks we consider. So, from now on we will not distinguish
between these two families, and just refer to (v, w)-regular codes.
In the McEliece framework, the public key is a generator matrix G for C; a ciphertext is
obtained as
x = mG+ e, (1)
where m ∈ Fk2 is the plaintext and e is a randomly generated n-tuple with weight t.
Decryption starts with the computation of the syndrome s = HxT = HeT , where T denotes
transposition. Then, an efficient syndrome decoding algorithm is applied on s, in order to
recover e.
In the Niederreiter formulation, the public key is a parity-check matrix H′ = SH for C,
where S is a dense non singular matrix. The plaintext m is converted into an n-tuple e with
weight t by means of an invertible mapping
M 7→ {e ∈ Fn2 |wt{e} = t}, (2)
where M is the space of all possible plaintexts m. The ciphertext is then computed as
x = H′eT . (3)
5Decryption starts with the computation of s = S−1x; then, an efficient syndrome decoding
algorithm is applied on s, in order to recover e, from which the plaintext m is reconstructed
by inverting (2).
Regardless of the particular system formulation we are considering (McEliece or Niederre-
iter), the decryption phase relies on a syndrome decoding algorithm, applied on the syndrome
of a weight-t error vector. Since, in the attacks we consider, information is leaked during
the decoding phase, we will not distinguish between the McEliece and the Niederreiter
formulation in the following.
The decoding algorithm must show a good trade-off between complexity and DFR; for this
reason, a common approach is that of relying on the so-called Bit Flipping (BF) decoders,
whose principle has been introduced by Gallager [14]. The description of a basic BF decoding
procedure is given in Algorithm 1. The decoder goes through a maximum number of iterations
i
max
, and at each iteration it exploits a likelihood criterion to estimate the error vector e.
Outputs of the decoder are the estimate of the error vector e′ and a boolean value ⊥ reporting
events of decoding failure. When ⊥ = 0, we have e′ = e, and decoding was successful; if
⊥ = 1, then e′ 6= e and we have encountered a decoding failure. So, clearly, the DFR can be
expressed as the probability that ⊥ = 1, noted as P{⊥ = 1}. The likelihood criterion is based
on a threshold b (line 11 of the algorithm), which, in principle, might also vary during the
iterations (for instance, some possibilities are discussed in [19]); all the simulations results
we show in this paper are referred to the simple case in which the threshold is kept constant
throughout all the decoding procedure. In particular, in the simulations we have run, the
values of i
max
and b have been chosen empirically. Our analysis is general and can be easily
extended to other decoders than those considered here. Indeed, many different decoders have
been analyzed in the literature (for instance, see [10] and [21]), and, as for the outcome of
reaction and timing attacks, there is no meaningful difference between them. This strongly
hints that such attacks are possible because of the probabilistic nature of the decoder, and
are only slightly affected by the particular choice of the decoder and its settings. However,
the analysis we provide in Section IV, which describes the decoder behaviour in the first
iteration, takes into account the effect of the threshold value.
We point out that Algorithm 1 is commonly called an out-of-place decoder, as the syndrome
s is updated after the set Ψ is computed. A different procedure is the one of in-place decoders,
in which the syndrome is updated every time a bit is estimated as error affected (i.e., after the
if instruction in line 11). In this paper we only focus on out-of-place decoders. The reason
is that the attacks we consider seem to be emphasized when in-place decoders are used [10],
6Algorithm 1 BFdecoder
Input: H ∈ Fr×n2 , s ∈ Fr2, imax ∈ N, b ∈ N
Output: e′ ∈ Fn2 , ⊥ ∈ F2
1: e′ ← 0n
2: ⊥ ← 0
3: i← 0
4: while wt{s} > 0 ∧ i < i
max
do
5: Ψ← ∅
6: for j ← 0 to n− 1 do
7: σj ← 0
8: for l ∈ φ(hj) do
9: σj ← σj + sl
10: end for
11: if σj ≥ b then
12: Ψ← Ψ ∪ j ⊲ Position j is estimated as error affected
13: end if
14: end for
15: for j ∈ Ψ do
16: e′j ← ¬e′j ⊲ Error estimation update
17: s← s + hj ⊲ Syndrome update
18: end for
19: i← i+ 1
20: end while
21: if wt{s} > 0 then
22: ⊥ ← 1 ⊲ Decoding failure
23: end if
24: return {e′,⊥}
[21]. However, even if a careful analysis is needed, it is very likely that our results can be
extended also to in-place decoders.
III. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR REACTION AND TIMING ATTACKS
In this section we describe a family of attacks based on statistical analyses, namely
statistical attacks. This family includes reaction attacks, in which data is collected through
7the observation of Bob’s reactions, and side-channel attacks. A statistical attack of the types
here considered can be described as follows.
Let us consider a public-key cryptosystem with private and public keys KS and KP ,
respectively, and security parameter λ (i.e., the best attack on the system has complexity
> 2λ). We denote as Decrypt(KS ,x) a decryption algorithm that, given a ciphertext x and
KS as inputs, returns either the plaintext m or a decryption failure. We define D(KS,x) as an
oracle that, queried with a ciphertext x, runs Decrypt(KS ,x) and returns some metrics that
describe the execution of the decryption algorithm. More details about the oracle’s replies
are provided next. An adversary, which is given KP , queries the oracle with N ciphertexts
{x(i) |i = 1, · · · , N }; we denote as y(i) the oracle’s reply to the i-th query x(i). The adversary
then runs an algorithm A(KP , {x(0), y(0)}, · · · , {x(N−1), y(N−1)}) that takes as inputs KP and
the pairs of oracle queries and replies, and returns K ′S . The algorithm A models the procedure
that performs a statistical analysis of the gathered data and reconstructs the secret key, or an
equivalent version of it. The time complexity of this whole procedure can be approximated
as
C = αN + CA, (4)
where α corresponds to the average number of operations performed for each query and CA
is the complexity of executing the algorithm A. The adversary is then challenged with a
randomly generated ciphertext x∗, corresponding to a plaintext m∗. We consider the attack
successful if C < 2λ and the probability of m = Decrypt(K ′S ,x
∗) being equal to m∗ is not
negligible (i.e., larger than 2−λ).
We point out that this formulation is general, since it does not distinguish between the
McEliece and Niederreiter cases. In the same way the private and public keys might be
generic. For example, this model describes also reaction attacks against LEDA cryptosystems
[5], in which the secret key consists of H and an additional sparse matrix Q.
The above model allows for taking into account many kinds of attacks, depending on
the oracle’s reply. For instance, when considering attacks based on decryption failures, the
oracle’s reply is a boolean value which is true in case of a failure and false otherwise.
When considering timing attacks based on the number of iterations, then the oracle’s reply
corresponds to the number of iterations run by the decoding algorithm.
In this paper we focus on systems with security against a Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA),
that is, the case in which a proper conversion (like the one of [16]) is applied to the
McEliece/Niederreiter cryptosystem, in order to achieve CCA security. In our attack model,
8this corresponds to assuming that the oracle queries are all randomly generated, i.e., the error
vectors used during encryption can be seen as randomly picked elements from the ensemble
of all n-uples with weight t. Opposed to the CCA case, in the Chosen Plaintext Attack
(CPA) case the opponent is free to choose the error vectors used during encryption: from
the adversary standpoint, the CPA assumption is clearly more optimistic than that of CCA,
and leads to improvements in the attack [15], [21]. Obviously, all results we discuss in this
paper can be extended to the CPA case.
One final remark is about the schemes we consider: as shown in [24], [25], the complexity
of algorithm A can be increased with proper choices in the structure of the secret key.
Basically, in these cases the adversary can gather information about the secret key, but cannot
efficiently use this information to reconstruct the secret key, or to obtain an equivalent version
of it. In this paper we do not consider such approaches and we assume that the algorithm A
always runs in a feasible time, as it occurs in [12], [15].
A. State-of-the-art statistical attacks
Modern statistical attacks [10], [12], [13], [15], [21] are specific to the sole case of QC
codes having the structure originally proposed in [3], which are defined through a secret
parity-check matrix in the form
H =
[
H0,H1, . . . ,Hn0−1
]
, (5)
where each Hi is a circulant matrix of weight v and n0 is a small integer. Thus, the
corresponding code is a (v, n0v)-regular code.
All existing statistical attacks are focused on guessing the existence (or absence) of some
cyclic distances between symbols 1 in H. In particular, an adversary aims at recovering the
following quantities, which were introduced in [15].
Distance spectrum: Given a vector a, with support φ(a) and length p, its distance spectrum
is defined as
DS(a) = {min{±(i− j) mod p}| i, j ∈ φ(a), i 6= j} . (6)
Multiplicity: We say that a distance d ∈ DS(a) has multiplicity µd if there are µd distinct
pairs in φ(a) which produce the same distance d.
Basically, the distance spectrum is the set of all distances with multiplicity larger than 0.
9It can be easily shown that all the rows of a circulant matrix are characterized by the same
distance spectrum; thus, given a circulant matrix M, we denote the distance spectrum of any
of its rows (say, the first one) as DS(M).
Statistical attacks proposed in the literature aim at estimating the distance spectrum of
the circulant blocks in the secret H, and are based on the observation that some quantities
that are typical of the decryption procedure depend on the number of common distances
between the error vector and the rows of the parity-check matrix. In particular, the generic
procedure of a statistical attack on a cryptosystem whose secret key is in the form (5) is
described in Algorithm 2; we have called the algorithm Ex-GJS in order to emphasize the
fact that it is an extended version of the original GJS attack [15], which was only focused
on a single circulant block in H. Our algorithm, which is inspired by that of [12], is a
generalization of the procedure in [15], in which all the circulant blocks in H are taken into
account. We present this algorithm in order to show the maximum amount of information
that state-of-the-art statistical attacks allow to recover.
Algorithm 2 Ex-GJS
Input: public key KP , number of queries N ∈ N
Output: estimates a(0), · · · , a(n0−1), b(0), · · · ,b(n0−1) ∈ N⌊p/2⌋.
1: Initialize a(0), · · · , a(n0−1), b(0), · · · ,b(n0−1) as null arrays of length ⌊p/2⌋
2: for i← 1 to N do
3: x(i) ← ciphertexts obtained through the error vector e(i)
4: y(i) ← D(KS,x(i))
5: for j ← 0 to n0 − 1 do
6: ∆j ← DS(e(i)j )
7: for d ∈ ∆j do
8: a
(j)
d ← a(j)d + y(i)
9: b
(j)
d ← b(j)d + 1
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: return {a(0), · · · , a(n0−1), b(0), · · · ,b(n0−1)}
The error vector used for the i-th query is expressed as e(i) = [e
(i)
0 , . . . , e
(i)
n0−1], where each
e
(i)
j has length p. The estimates a
(0), . . . , a(n0−1) and b(0), . . . ,b(n0−1) are then used by the
adversary to guess the distance spectra of the blocks in the secret key. Indeed, let us define
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E (d,j)(n, t) as the ensemble of all error vectors having length n, weight t and such that they
exhibit a distance d in the distance spectrum of the j-th length-p block. Then, depending
on the meaning of the oracle’s reply, the ratios a
(j)
d /b
(j)
d correspond to the estimate of the
average value of some quantity, when the error vector belongs to E (d,j)(n, t). For instance,
when considering attacks based on decryption failures, the oracle’s reply is either 0 or 1,
depending on whether the decryption was successful or failed. In such a case, the ratio
a
(j)
d /b
(j)
d corresponds to the empirical measurement of the DFR, conditioned to the event that
the error vector belongs to E (j,d)(n, t). In general, statistical attacks are successful because
many quantities that are typical of the decoding procedure depend on the multiplicity of the
distances in DS(Hj). In the next section we generalize this procedure, by considering different
ensembles for the error vectors; then, in Section IV, we provide a theoretical explanation for
such a phenomenon.
B. Exploiting decryption failures on generic codes
In this section we generalize the Ex-GJS procedure, and describe an algorithm which can
be used to recover information about any regular code. In particular, our analysis shows that
events of decoding failure i) do not strictly depend on the QC structure of the adopted code,
and ii) permit to retrieve a quantity that is more general than distance spectra.
We first show that, for generic regular codes, there is a connection between the syndrome
weight and the DFR. This statement is validated by numerical simulations on (v, w)-regular
codes, obtained through Gallager construction [14], in which v
w
= r
n
. In particular, we have
considered two codes with length n = 5000, redundancy r = 2500 and different pairs (v, w),
decoded through Algorithm 1; their DFR (i.e., the probability of Algorithm 1 returning
⊥ = 1) vs. syndrome weight is shown in Fig. 1. We notice from Fig. 1 that there is a
strong dependence between the initial syndrome weight and the DFR and that different pairs
(v, w) can lead to two different trends in the DFR evolution. Section IV is devoted to the
explanation of this phenomenon.
Let us now define E(n, t, i0, i1) as the ensemble of all vectors having length n, weight t
and whose support contains elements i0 and i1. Let s be the syndrome of an error vector
e ∈ E(n, t, i0, i1): we have
s = hi0 + hi1 +
∑
j∈φ(e)\{i0,i1}
hj. (7)
The syndrome weight has a probability distribution that depends on the interplay between hi0
and hi1 : basically, when these two columns overlap in a small (large) number of ones, then the
11
Fig. 1. Distribution of the DFR as a function of the syndrome weight, for two regular (v, w)-regular LDPC codes, decoded
through Algorithm 1 with imax = 5 and b = 15. The weight of the error vectors is t = 58; for each code, 10
7 decoding
instances have been considered.
average syndrome weight gets larger (lower). Moreover, motivated by the empirical evidence
of Fig. 1, one can expect that the DFR experienced over error vectors belonging to different
ensembles E(n, t, i0, i1) depends on the number of overlapping ones between columns hi0 and
hi1 . Then, a statistical attack against a generic regular code can be mounted, as described
in Algorithm 3, which we denote as General Statistical Attack (GSA). The output of the
algorithm is represented by the matrices A and B, which are used by the adversary to
estimate the average value of the oracle’s replies, as a function of the pair (i0, i1). Notice
that in Algorithm 3 the oracle’s reply is denoted as y(i) and does not need to be better
specified. We will indeed show in Section V that the same procedure can be used to exploit
other information sources than the success (or failure) of decryption.
We now focus on the case of y(i) being 0 or 1, depending on whether decryption was
successful or not. Then, each ratio aj,l/bj,l is the empirical estimate of the probability of
encountering a decryption failure, when the error vector contains both j and l in its support.
One might expect that the ratios aj,l/bj,l are distributed on the basis of the number of
overlapping ones between columns j and l in H. We have verified this intuition by means
of numerical simulations; the results we have obtained are shown in Fig. 2, for the case of
error vectors belonging to ensembles E(n, t, 0, j), with j ∈ [1, . . . , n− 1]. The figure clearly
shows that the ratios aj,l/bj,l can be used to guess the number of overlapping ones between
any pair of columns in H.
These empirical results confirm the conjecture that the DFR corresponding to error vectors
12
Algorithm 3 GSA
Input: public key KP , number of queries N ∈ N
Output: estimates A,B ∈ Nn×n.
1: A← 0n×n
2: B← 0n×n
3: for i← 1 to N do
4: x(i) ← ciphertexts obtained through the error vector e(i)
5: y(i) ← D(KS,x(i))
6: φ(e(i))← support of e(i)
7: for j ∈ φ(e(i)) do
8: for l ∈ φ(e(i)) do
9: aj,l ← aj,l + y(i)
10: bj,l ← bj,l + 1
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: return {A,B}
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Simulation results for (v, w)-regular code with n = 5000, k = 2500, for t = 58 and for error vector belonging to
ensembles E(n, t, 0, j), for j ∈ [1, . . . , n − 1]. The parameters of the codes are v = 25, w = 50 for Figure (a), v = 20,
w = 40 for Figure (b); the decoder settings are imax = 5 and b = 15. The results have been obtained through the simulation
of 109 decoding instances. Grey, blue, green, black and red markers are referred to pairs of columns with number of
intersections equal to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively.
in E(n, t, i0, i1) depends on the number of overlapping ones between the columns i0 and i1.
Moreover, these results show that the same idea of [15], with some generalization, can be
applied to whichever kind of code.
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We now show that even when QC codes are considered, our algorithm recovers more
information than that which can be obtained through the Ex-GJS procedure. For such a
purpose, let us consider a parity-check matrix in the form (5), and let γi,j be the number of
overlapping ones between columns i and j. Now, because of the QC structure, we have
|hi ∩ hj | =
∣∣hp⌊i/p⌋+[i+z mod p] ∩ hp⌊j/p⌋+[j+z mod p]∣∣ , ∀z. (8)
We now consider two columns that belong to the same circulant block inH, i.e. i = pip+i
′,
j = pip + j
′, where 0 ≤ ip ≤ n0 − 1; then, (8) can be rewritten as
|hi ∩ hj | =
∣∣hpip+[i′+z mod p] ∩ hpip+[j′+z mod p]∣∣ , ∀z. (9)
With some simple computations, we finally obtain
∣∣hpip+i′ ∩ hpip+j′∣∣ =


∣∣hpip ∩ hpip+p−(i′−j′)∣∣ if j′ < i′∣∣hpip ∩ hpip+j′−i′)∣∣ if j′ > i′
, (10)
which holds for all indices i′, j′ ∈ [0, . . . , p−1], i′ 6= j′. Similar considerations can be carried
out if the two columns do not belong to the same circulant block. So, (10) shows that the
whole information about overlapping ones between columns in H is actually represented by
a subset of all the possible values of γi,j. This means that the execution of Algorithm 3 can
be sped up by taking the QC structure into account.
In particular, the values of γi,j can be used to obtain the distance spectra of the blocks
in H in a straightforward way. Let us refer to Equation (10), and look at two columns hpip
and hj , with j = pip + j
′, where j′ ∈ [0, 1, . . . , p − 1]. We denote the support of hpip as
φ(hpip) = {c(pip)0 , · · · , c(pip)v−1 }. The support of hj can be expressed as
φ(hj) = {c(j)l
∣∣∣c(j)l = c(pip)l + j′ mod p, l ∈ [0, . . . , v − 1], c(pip)l ∈ φ(hpip)}. (11)
Then, we have
∣∣φ(hpip) ∩ φ(hj)∣∣ = γpip,j; this means that there are γpip,j pairs {c, c′} ∈
φ(hpip)× φ(hj) such that
c′ = c+ dmod p, d ∈ {j′, p− j′}. (12)
It is easy to see that (12) corresponds to the definition of the distance spectrum of the blocks
in H; then, (12) can be turned into the following rule
∣∣φ(hpip) ∩ φ(hpip + j′)∣∣ = γ ↔ d ∈ DS(Hip), µd = γ, (13)
with d = min{±j′ mod p}.
This proves that the procedure described by Algorithm 3 allows obtaining at least the same
amount of information recovered through the Ex-GJS algorithm, which is specific to the QC
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case and guarantees a complete cryptanalysis of the system [15]. In other words, our analysis
confirms that Algorithm 3 is applicable and successful in at least all the scenarios in which
the attack from [15] works. Moreover, our procedure allows for recovering a larger amount
of information about the secret key, and thus defines a broader perimeter of information
retrieval, which encompasses existing and future attacks.
IV. AN APPROXIMATED MODEL FOR REACTION ATTACKS
The main result of this section is summarized in the following proposition, for which we
provide theoretical justifications and empirical evidences.
Proposition 1 Let H be the parity-check matrix of a (v, w)-regular code, which is decoded
through Algorithm 1 with decoding threshold b. Let (i0, i1) and (i
∗
0, i
∗
1) be two distinct pairs
of indexes, and consider error vectors e ∈ E(n, t, i0, i1) and e∗ ∈ E(n, t, i∗0, i∗1). Let ǫ and ǫ∗
be the probabilities that e and e∗ result in a decoding failure, respectively. Let e′[1] be the
error vector estimate after the first iteration; we define e′ = e+ e′[1] and t
′ = wt{e′}. Then,
ǫ > ǫ∗ if and only if E [t′] > E [t′∗], where E [ · ] denotes the expected value.
Essentially, the above proposition implies that increments (reductions) of the DFR are due
to the fact that, depending on the particular matrix H, some error patterns tend to produce,
on average, a larger (lower) amount of residual errors, after the first decoder iteration. First
of all, this statement is actually supported by empirical evidences: we have run numerical
simulations on the same codes as those in Fig.s 1 and 2, and have evaluated the number
of residual errors after the first iteration. The results are shown in Fig. 3; as we can see,
accordingly with Proposition 1, the trend of the DFR and the one of t′ are the same for the
analyzed codes.
We now derive a statistical model which approximates how the BF decoder described in
Algorithm 1 evolves during the first iteration; through this model we can predict the values
of t′ and, thus, also justify the different trends of the DFR observed in Fig.s 1 and 2. We
choose two distinct integers i0, i1 and consider the case of an error vector randomly drawn
from the ensemble E(n, t, i0, i1), that is, we take columns i0 and i1 of H as a reference,
assuming that ei0 = ei1 = 1. We also suppose that the columns i0 and i1 of H overlap in γ
positions, and aim at expressing the average value of t′ as a function of the code parameters,
the decoding threshold b and the value of γ.
Let us first partition the sets of parity-check equations and variable nodes as follows.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Simulation results for the number of residual errors after the first iteration of BF decoding, for (v, w)-regular codes
with n = 5000, k = 2500, for t = 58 and for error vector drawn from ensembles E(n, t, 0, j), for j ∈ [1, . . . , n − 1].
The parameters of the codes are v = 25, w = 50 for Figure (a), v = 20, w = 40 for Figure (b); the decoder settings are
imax = 5 and b = 15. The results have been obtained through the simulation of 10
9 decoding instances. Grey, blue, green,
black and red markers are referred to pairs of columns with number of intersections equal to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively.
Definition 1 Given an r×n parity-check matrixH, the set {0, 1, · · · , r−1} can be partitioned
into three subsets, defined as follows:
i) P0: the set of parity-check equations that involve both bits i0 and i1, that is
j ∈ P0 iff hj,i0 = 1 ∧ hj,i1 = 1;
ii) P1: the set of parity-check equations that involve either bit i0 or bit i1, that is
j ∈ P1 iff (hj,i0 = 1 ∧ hj,i1 = 0) ∨ (hj,i0 = 0 ∧ hj,i1 = 1);
iii) P2: the set of parity-check equations that do not involve bits i0 and i1, that is
j ∈ P2 iff hj,i0 = 0 ∧ hj,i1 = 0.
Definition 2 Let Vi, with i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, be the set defined as
Vi =


{ l ∈ [0;n− 1] \ {i0, i1}| ∃j ∈ Pi s.t. hj,l = 1} if i = 0, 1
{ l ∈ [0;n− 1] \ {i0, i1}| 6 ∃j ∈ P0 ∪ P1 s.t. hj,l = 1} if i = 2
. (14)
The cardinality of each set Vi depends on the particular matrix H. However, when con-
sidering a regular code, we can derive some general properties, as stated in the following
lemma.
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Lemma 1 Given a (v, w)-regular code, the following bounds on the size of the sets Vi, with
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, as defined in Definition 2, hold

|V0| ≤ γ(w − 2),
|V1| ≤ (2v − 2γ)(w − 1),
|V2| ≥ n− 2 + γw − 2v(w − 1).
(15)
Proof: The first bound in (15) follows from the fact that |P0| = γ. Any parity-check
equation in P0 involves w bits, including i0 and i1. So, all the parity-check equations in P0
involve, at most, γ(w−2) bits other than i0 and i1. The second bound in (15) can be derived
with similar arguments, considering that |P1| = 2(v − γ), and either i0 or i1 participates
to the parity-check equations in P1. The third bound is simply obtained by considering the
remaining r + γ − 2v parity-check equations, when the other two bounds in (15) hold with
equality sign.
From now on, in order to make our analysis as general as possible, i.e., independent of the
particular H, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Let H be the r× n parity-check matrix of a (v, w)-regular code. We assume
that each variable node other than i0 and i1 either participates in just one parity-check
equation from P0 or P1 and v−1 equations in P2, or participates in v parity-check equations
in P2. This means that 

|V0| = γ(w − 2),
|V1| = (2v − 2γ)(w − 1),
|V2| = n− 2 + γw − 2v(w − 1).
(16)
The previous assumption is justified by the fact that, due to the sparsity of H, we have
r ≫ v; it then follows that |P0| ≪ |P2| and |P1| ≪ |P2|. Clearly, this assumption becomes
more realistic as the matrix H gets sparser.
We additionally define t(i) = |φ(e) ∩ Vi|; clearly, we have t(0) + t(1) + t(2) = t − 2. The
probability of having a specific configuration of t(0), t(1) and t(2) is equal to
P{t(0),t(1),t(2)} =
(|V0|
t(0)
)(|V1|)
t(1)
)(|V2|
t(2)
)
(
n−2
t−2
) . (17)
In analogous way, we define t(i)
′
as the number of nodes that are in V(i) and are simultaneously
set in e + e′[1]. In other words, t
(i)′ corresponds to the number of errors that, after the first
iteration, affect bits in Vi.
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The definitions of the sets Vi are useful to analyze how the value of γ influences the
decoder choices. We focus on a generic j-th bit, with j 6= i0, i1, and consider the value of
σj , as defined in Algorithm 1. Because of Assumption 1, we have that
1) if j ∈ V0 (resp. V1), the j-th bit participates in one parity-check equation from P0 (resp.
V1) and v − 1 parity-check equations in P2;
2) if j ∈ V2, the j-th bit participates in v parity-check equations in P2;
3) if j ∈ {i0, i1}, then it participates in γ parity-check equations from P0 and v − γ
parity-check equations from P1.
Let p
(i)
d,u, with i = {0, 1, 2}, be the probability that a parity-check equation involving the j-th
bit (with j 6= i0, i1) and contained in Pi is unsatisfied, in the case of ej = d, with d ∈ {0, 1};
the value of such a probability is expressed by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Let us consider a (v, w)-regular code with blocklength n and an error vector e
with weight t. Then, the probabilities p
(i)
d,u, with i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and d ∈ {0, 1}, can be calculated
as
p
(0)
0,u =
min{w−3,t−2}∑
l=1
l odd
(
w−3
l
)(
n−w
t−l−2
)
(
n−3
t−2
) ,
p
(1)
0,u =
min{w−2,t−2}∑
l=0
l even
(
w−2
l
)(
n−w−1
t−l−2
)
(
n−3
t−2
) ,
p
(0)
1,u =
min{w−3,t−3}∑
l=0
l even
(
w−3
l
)(
n−w
t−l−3
)
(
n−3
t−3
) ,
p
(1)
1,u =
min{w−2,t−3}∑
l=1
l odd
(
w−2
l
)(
n−w−1
t−l−3
)
(
n−3
t−3
) ,
p
(2)
0,u =
min{w−1,t−2}∑
l=1
l odd
(
w−1
l
)(
n−w−2
t−l−2
)
(
n−3
t−2
) ,
p
(2)
1,u =
min{w−1,t−3}∑
l=0
l even
(
w−1
l
)(
n−w−2
t−l−3
)
(
n−3
t−3
) .
(18)
Proof: Let us first consider i = 0 and d = 0. Let us also consider the j-th bit, different
from i0 and i1. Any parity check equation in P0 overlaps with the error vector in two
positions, as it involves both bits i0 and i1; since we are looking at an error-free bit, then the
parity-check equation will be unsatisfied only if the remaining t− 2 errors intercept an odd
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number of ones, among the remaining w − 3 ones. Simple combinatorial arguments lead to
the first expression of (18). All the other expressions can be derived with similar arguments.
We also define p
(i)
E,u, with i ∈ {0, 1}, as the probability that a parity-check equation involving
a bit ∈ {i0, i1}, and contained in Pi, is unsatisfied; the value of such a probability is derived
in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Let us consider a (v, w)-regular code with blocklength n and an error vector e
with weight t. Then, the probabilities p
(i)
E,u, with i ∈ {0, 1}, can be calculated as
p
(0)
E,u =
min{w−2,t−2}∑
l=1
l odd
(
w−2
l
)(
n−w
t−2−l
)
(
n−2
t−2
) , (19)
p
(1)
E,u =
min{w−1,t−2}∑
l=0
l even
(
w−1
l
)(
n−w−1
t−2−l
)
(
n−2
t−2
) . (20)
Proof: The proof can be carried on with the same arguments of the proof of Lemma 2.
We now consider the following assumption.
Assumption 2 Let H be the parity-check matrix of a (v, w)-regular code. We assume that
the parity-check equations in which the j-th bit is involved are statistically independent; thus,
σj , defined as in Algorithm 1, can be described in the first decoding iteration as the sum of
independent Bernoulli random variables, each one having its own probability of being set,
which corresponds either to p
(i)
d,u or p
(d)
E,u, where i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and d ∈ {0, 1}.
We now define P
(i)
d,flip as the probability that the decoder flips the j-th bit, in the case that
j 6= i0, i1 and j ∈ Vi, when ej = d. In analogous way, PE,flip denotes the probability that,
when j ∈ {i0, i1}, the decoder flips the j-th bit. The above probabilities are computed in
Lemmas 4, 5, respectively.
Lemma 4 Let us consider a (v, w)-regular code with blocklength n and an error vector
e with weight t; let b denote the decoding threshold employed in the first iteration. Then,
under Assumptions 1 and 2, the probabilities P
(i)
d,flip, with i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and d ∈ {0, 1}, can
be computed as follows
P
(0)
d,flip = P{σ(2)j = b− 1|ej = d}p(0)d,u +
v−1∑
l=b
P{σ(2)j = l|ej = d}, (21)
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P
(1)
d,flip = P{σ(2)j = b− 1|ej = d}p(1)d,u +
v−1∑
l=b
P{σ(2)j = l|ej = d}. (22)
P
(2)
d,flip =
v∑
l=b
(
v
l
)(
p
(2)
d,u
)l (
1− p(2)d,u
)v−l
. (23)
Proof: When j ∈ V0, the j-th bit is involved in one parity-check equation in P0 and
v− 1 equations in P2. The probability that the decoder in the first iteration flips the j-th bit
can be computed as
P
(0)
d,flip = P{σ(2)j = b− 1|ej = d}p(0)d,u + P{σ(2)j ≥ b|ej = d}. (24)
In particular, we have
P{σ(2)j = z|ej = d} =
(
v − 1
z
)(
p
(2)
d,u
)z (
1− p(2)d,u
)v−1−z
, (25)
so that
P
(0)
d,flip = P{σ(2)j = b− 1|ej = d}p(0)d,u +
v−1∑
l=b
P{σ(2)j = l|ej = d}. (26)
Similarly, if j ∈ V1, then it is involved in one parity-check equation in P1 and v−1 equations
in P2; thus, we have
P
(1)
d,flip = P{σ(2)j = b− 1|ej = d}p(1)d,u +
v−1∑
l=b
P{σ(2)j = l|ej = d}. (27)
Finally, if j ∈ V2, then it is involved in v parity-check equations in V2; using a similar
reasoning as in the previous cases, we can write
P
(2)
d,flip =
v∑
l=b
(
v
l
)(
p
(2)
d,u
)l (
1− p(2)d,u
)v−l
. (28)
This proves the lemma.
Lemma 5 Let us consider a (v, w)-regular code with blocklength n and an error vector e
with weight t; let b denote the decoding threshold employed in the first iteration. Then, under
Assumptions 1 and 2, the probability PE,flip can be computed as follows
PE,flip =
γ∑
l(0)=0
v−γ∑
l(1)=b−l(0)
P{σ(0)E = l(0)}P{σ(1)E = l(1)}, (29)
where 

P{σ(0)E = l} =
(
γ
l
) (
p
(0)
E,u
)l (
1− p(0)E,u
)γ−l
,
P{σ(1)E = l} =
(
v−γ
l
) (
p
(1)
E,u
)l (
1− p(1)E,u
)v−γ−l
.
(30)
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Proof: Eq. (30) derives from the fact that bits i0 and i1 participate in γ parity-check
equations in P0; furthermore, both i0 and i1 participate in v− γ equations in P1 each. Then,
(29) expresses the probability that the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations for bit
i0 or i1 is not smaller than the threshold b.
In order to estimate the average number of bits flipped after one iteration, we have to
consider all the possible configurations of the error vector e. As for the bits which are not
in E the average value of t(i)′ can be computed as
E
[
t(i)
′
]
= t(i)
(
1− P (i)1,flip
)
+
(|Vi| − t(i))P (i)0,flip, (31)
and the average number of errors in all bits V = ⋃2i=0 Vi can be estimated as
E [t′V ] =
min{t−2,|V0|}∑
t(0)=0
min{t(1)+t(2),|V1|}∑
t(1)=0
E{t(0),t(1),t(2)} · P{t(0),t(1),t(2)}, (32)
where t(2) = t− 2− (t(0) + t(1)) and E{t(0) ,t(1),t(2)} = E
[
t(0)
′
]
+ E
[
t(1)
′
]
+ E
[
t(2)
′
]
.
Similarly, the average number of residual errors due to the bits in E can be derived as
E[t′E ] = 2(1− PE,flip). (33)
We can finally obtain the average value of t′ over all bits in {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} as
E [t′] = E[t′E ] + E [t
′
V ] . (34)
A comparison between the simulated average values of t′ and the theoretical ones is shown
in Table I for the two codes already considered in Figures 2 and 3, as a function of γ. As
we can see, this model allows for a close prediction of the average value of t′ starting from
the number of overlapping ones γ. This also allows an accurate modeling of the behaviour
of the number of errors (increasing or decreasing) as a function of γ.
γ
Code (a) Code (b)
Simulated Theoretical Simulated Theoretical
0 49.59 48.98 33.63 33.64
1 49.33 48.76 33.72 33.73
2 49.07 48.55 33.80 33.80
3 48.81 48.34 33.86 33.86
4 48.55 48.15 - -
TABLE I
AVERAGE VALUES OF t′ , FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF γ . CODE (A) AND CODE (B) ARE THE SAME AS THOSE
CONSIDERED IN FIGURES 2 AND 3.
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V. OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In this section we show some additional information leaks that might be exploited by an
adversary to gather information about the structure of the secret H.
The results in the previous section show how, on average, the number of residual errors
after the first iteration can be associated to the number of overlapping ones between columns
of H. Then, if the opponent has access to e′[1] (i.e., to the positions that have been flipped
in the first iteration), he can succeed in recovering the values of γi,j . Indeed, once e
′
[1] is
known, the opponent can compute the number of residual errors for each query as e + e′[1].
Basically, this statistical attack can be modeled through Algorithm 3, by assuming that the
oracle’s answer y(i) is t′, that is, to the weight of e+ e′[1]. The results in the previous section
clearly show that this procedure allows for the cryptanalysis of the system.
We point out that, in a practical scenario, the locations of the bits that have been flipped by
the decoder can be estimated through some power analysis attack, as in [11]. This information
might be masked through proper implementation strategies; for instance, random permutations
might be applied to the order of processing bits in the decoder. This solution, which was
proposed by the authors of [11] as a countermeasure to the attack they introduced in the
same paper, is however likely not to be strong enough for guaranteeing prevention of other
kinds of information leaks.
For instance, let us suppose that the oracle’s reply in Algorithm 3 is the weight of e′[1],
i.e., to the number of flips performed in the first iteration. In a real case scenario, estimating
this quantity might not be too hard. Indeed, each flip requires the update of the error vector
(one operation) and the update of the syndrome (v operations). Thus, we might expect that
the duration of the first iteration, and/or its power consumption, linearly increases with the
weight of e′[1]. It can be shown that also this quantity depends on the number of intersections
between columns.
Indeed, let us recall the notation adopted in the previous section, and define as N
(i)
V ,flip the
average number of flips performed among nodes in Vi. We can write
N
(i)
V ,flip = t
(i)′P
(i)
1,flip + (|Vi| − t(i)
′
)P
(i)
0,flip, (35)
so that the average number of flips in V is
NV ,flip =
min{t−2,|V0|}∑
t(0)=0
min{t(1)+t(2),|V1|}∑
t(1)=0
P{t(0),t(1),t(2)}
[
N
(0)
V ,flip +N
(1)
V ,flip +N
(2)
V ,flip
]
. (36)
where t(2) = t− 2− (t(0) + t(1)).
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The average number of flips for the bits in E is equal to NE,flip = 2PE,flip. So, combining
the effect of the above equations, we have
Nflip = NE,flip +NV ,flip. (37)
The probabilities in (36) depend on the value of γ; so, statistical attacks based on this
quantity are expected to be successful. We have verified this intuition by means of numerical
simulations, and the results are shown at the end of this section.
Another quantity that might leak information about the secret key is represented by the
evolution of the syndrome weight during iterations. Authors in [10] have shown that the
weight of the initial syndrome s = HeT reveals information about the secret key; making
a little step forward, we show that this consideration is indeed general and holds also for
the first iteration. We model this attack by assuming that an adversary runs Algorithm 3
and the oracle replies with the syndrome weight after the first iteration, i.e. the weight of
s′ = H(e + e′[1])
T . In general, we expect t′ ≪ n. On the other hand, large values of t′ are
associated to large weights of s′ as well. Since we have verified in the previous sections
that error vectors drawn from ensembles E(n, t, i0, i1) are associated to different values of
t′, it follows that also the syndrome weight depends on the number of intersections between
columns of H.
We have verified all these ideas by means of numerical simulations. In particular, we have
considered QC codes, described by H in the form (5), in the case of n0 = 2, p = 4801 and
v = 45.
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Fig. 4. Simulation results for statistical attacks based on t′ and wt{s′}. Figure (a) shows the distribution of the values of
t′, Figure (b) shows the weight of s′. The decoding threshold is b = 28; results have been obtained through the simulation
of 108 decoding instances. Grey, blue, green, black, red and violet markers are referred to couples of columns with number
of intersections equal to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively.
We have chosen t = 84 and b = 28, and applied Algorithm 3 with N = 108, considering
that the oracle replies with: i) the average number of errors after the first iteration in Figure
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4(a), ii) the average weight of the syndrome vector after the first iteration in Figure 4(b).
This empirical evidence confirms our conjectures, and proves that these data, when leaked,
might lead to a complete cryptanalysis of the system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have provided a deep analysis of statistical attacks against LDPC and
MDPC code-based cryptosystems. We have considered a simple BF decoder, and have shown
that its probabilistic nature might yield a substantial information leakage. We have shown
that a general model for statistical attacks can be defined, and that many quantities, when
observed by the opponent, might be exploited to recover information about the secret key.
Our analysis confirms that, in order to safely use long-lasting keys in McEliece cryptosystem
variants based on sparse parity-check matrix codes, a constant time and power implementation
is necessary, along with a negligible DFR.
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